ABSTRACT A well-monitored and reasonable-assessed protection system can lead to the improved operation and reliability of power systems. In this paper, a systematic and efficient operation condition assessment (OCA) method and its practical implementation for protection systems are proposed. Considering the device configuration and information transmission scheme, a protection system operation condition model (PSOCM) is developed. Based on the PSOCM, an OCA method is designed to assess the statuses of devices, information flows, information transmission branches, and relay functions. To verify the effectiveness of the proposed method, a master-substation operation condition assessment system (MS-OCAS), which utilizes real-time monitoring and other raw data, is demonstrated. As shown by the experimental results for a 110 kV IEC 61850-based substation, the proposed method, and system can realize the whole-view OCA of protection systems and can dramatically increase the maintenance efficiency.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Protection systems serves as the guardian of power grids, isolating and clearing failures as soon as they occur. Ensuring reliable protection for primary equipment, i.e., the reliability of protection systems, is always an essential security task for power systems [1] . With the application of networked protection scheme and advanced information and communication technology (ICT), protection systems have gradually become cyber-physical complex systems. Consequently, any single failure may lead to incorrect tripping or malfunctions or even eventually result in the cascading failures of power systems [2] - [4] . In this context, the operation condition of a protection system and its influences have become more complicated.
Based on historical or real-time data, an operation condition assessment (OCA) can deduce the status of a system within a certain time interval [5] . Whole-view and reasonable OCA results can provide references for fault diagnosis, condition-based maintenance, and intelligent alarming, therefore ensuring the reliability of protection systems. With the development of sensors and condition monitoring technologies, more real-time monitoring data can be utilized in the OCA. Compared with historical data, the volume, diversity and time distribution of these real-time data are larger and far more suitable for reflecting the current status of a system [6] - [8] .
However, there are two challenging problems and disadvantages in the existing OCA methods:
• A whole-view and systematic OCA method is lacking, since published approaches mostly focus on single-function components or single events. For example, Liu et al. [2] and Etemadi and Firuzabad [9] , [10] have basically focused on the hardware status of protective relaying devices. Zhang et al. [11] have mainly focused on relay functions. However, protective relay technologies have developed from single-function and static relays to modern multifunction digital relays over the past few years [9] , [12] . In this communication-constrained context, incorrect information or communication networks can also affect the operation condition of protection systems, which is why the statuses of the information and communication networks should also be considered. Liu et al. [3] analyzed the possible risks that a protection system may face under malicious cyberattacks. Reference [3] demonstrates the necessity of analyzing the influences on the operation condition of protection systems caused by information contingencies. Rahman et al. [13] and Yang et al. [14] proposed some detection approaches for abnormal information intrusions to maintain a healthy cyber circumstance for protection systems. Dai et al. [15] presented a reliability evaluation method for communication systems in wide-area protection, which has revealed the importance of the communication network status for protection systems. In facts, the reliable operation of a protection system depends on various key factors, including healthy devices, reliable device functions, correct information transmission and faultless communication networks.
• The assessment efficiency is relatively low, and the monitoring information is not fully utilized. For example, conventional assessment approaches are based on self-checking and periodical inspections [16] , which exhibit drawbacks as the system volume gets larger; these drawbacks include the outage time for periodical inspections becoming longer, overarranged human resources for operation and maintenance (O&M), assessment results being offline, and very low assessment frequency. Currently, condition monitoring technology can provide sufficient raw data for the OCA, although these data are not directly related to the component condition [8] .
To address these two drawbacks, this paper aims to propose a systematic and efficient OCA method that is essential for a well-monitored and reasonable-assessed protection system. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• An OCA method is designed to assess the statuses of devices, information flows, information transmission branches and relay functions based on a protection system operation condition model (PSOCM) which illustrates the device configuration and information transmission scheme of protection systems.
• A master-substation operation condition assessment system (MS-OCAS) is developed. It consists of the operation condition analysis subsystem in substations (OCAS) and an operation condition assessment system in the master station (OCAM). The MS-OCAS can realize efficient distributed analysis in substations and centralized analysis in the master station with real-time monitoring information. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the architecture of the protection systems and the OCA issue. The PSOCM is proposed in Section III, which depicts the target statuses in the OCA. An OCA method for protection systems is presented in Section IV, followed by the practical implementation in Section V and the experimental results in Section VI. Section VII presents the conclusions.
II. OPERATION CONDITION ASSESSMENT ISSUE
The realization of basic functions for protection systems, such as data acquisition, data manipulation and indication, is highly dependent on the deployment of secondary devices and the connections between them [17] . Devices, including current or voltage transformers and protective relaying devices, are basic components of a protection system. Therefore, it is essential to assess the device status in the OCA issues. Furthermore, we are also concerned with the device function status; here, the status refers to the selectivity, speed, sensibility and reliability of a protective relaying device.
Nevertheless, the normal operation of a protection system depends not only on well-operated devices but also on the correct-transported information. Various types of messages are carried within the communication system in a protection system. Typically, in a traditional protection system, cables carry the electronic signals, and the station bus network carries control commands in the form of messages defined in the IEC 60870-5-103 protocol. In an IEC 61850-based protection system, the sequences of sampled value (SV), generic object-oriented substation events (GOOSE), manufacturing message specification (MMS) data packages and so on are transported from a source device to a destination; these sequences are regarded as the information flows [16] .
In this paper, the connections between devices that carry information flows are called ''branches''. The components of a branch relate closely to its techniques. For a traditional protection system, devices are connected mainly via cables to achieve peer-to-peer communication, except in the station bay where devices communicate with networks. For an IEC 61850-based protection system, an architecture form of ''three layers of equipment, two layers of network'' has been adopted, and information flows are transported by the network among the switches and devices [17] . Specifically, there are two main types of branches in a protection system (See Fig. 1 ). For both types, the ports are still the two-end of a branch and are crucial nodes for information transmission. Physical branches that connect pairs of device ports or a device port and a switch port are made of cables or fibers. Virtual local-area networks (VLANs) are often used to connect pairs of switch ports while separating between different information flows [18] , [21] . To summarize, the statuses of these information flows and their transmission branches are also indispensable in the OCA issue. The operation of the protection system can be described as a process of information exchange and analysis between different cyber units that output relay action results in the end [19] . If the condition monitoring process is considered, then the condition monitoring measurements should also be added to the system output. These outputs can serve as the input datasets for the OCA process. Specifically, based on condition monitoring measurements, the statuses of device, information and branch can be assessed, and the relay function status can be assessed based on relay action results. (See Fig. 2) . To summarize, the OCA issue mainly concerns the PSOC, i.e., device status, information status, branch status and device function status, of a protection system, which can be denoted as DS, IS, BS and FS, respectively. Specifically, the OCA can be described as follows: 1) whether the DS, IS and BS of a protection system within a certain time period can be assessed based on condition monitoring information; and 2) whether the FS, i.e., selectivity, speed, sensibility and reliability of a protective relaying device within a certain time period can be assessed based on the relay action results.
III. OPERATION CONDITION MODEL FOR PROTECTION SYSTEMS
In this paper, we define the concept of the PSOC to integrate the abovementioned characteristic elements that describe an operating protection system. Therefore, a PSOCM is proposed in this section, which is represented by the multicomponent set O below.
O = {D, I, B, F}
(
where D and I indicate the devices and the information flows in a protection system, respectively. B denotes the branches between those devices. F represents the relay functions. Each element of the PSOCM is discussed in detail in the following subsections. (To give a clear definition of I, we will discuss B before it.)
A. DEVICE D Suppose that there are K bays and M devices in a protection system. Thus, these devices can be expressed as (2) below, in which each element represents a particular device whose sequence and affiliated bay are denoted by its subscript and superscript.
In addition, the device configuration parameters, denoted as C i , wherei is the sequence number of the device, are also worth noting. In this paper, the basic configuration parameters that we consider are the relay setting values (C Oi ), VOLUME 7, 2019 the relay start-up values (C Si ) and the strap combination scheme of a protective relaying device. A strap can be regarded as a switch of a certain function, i.e., the ''on'' status of a strap represents a successful connection, while ''off'' means an interruption [16] .
A strap description multicomponent set CY i is defined to denote every strap that the device i contains. Basically, the set includes the publishing strap C Pik (which controls the information publishing process from device i to device k), the receiving straps C Rki (which controls the information receiving process from device i to device k), the function straps C Fi (which control whether a function is put into use) and the maintenance straps C Mi (remain ''off'' during normal operation and switch ''on'' when maintenance is needed). Here, we have
The element of CY i equals 1 if a strap is ''on'' and equals 0 otherwise.
B. INFORMATION I
As discussed above, ports are crucial nodes for information transmission. Consequently, a port is considered a basic unit when defining the branch and information flow model in the following subsections. Assume that there are P ports in a protection system. A P × P matrix D P×P is defined to describe the connections among ports, whose element d ij denotes Branch ij directing from port i to port j. In this paper, an information description set I-Branch ij describes the information flows carried in Branch ij , where the contents inside '' '' are the standard names of the physical components. Notably, the elements in the description set are allowed to be heterotic, and this will not be repeated in the remainder of this paper.
where '' G '', '' S '', and '' M '' refer to GOOSE, SV and MMS messages, respectively.
C. BRANCH B
Moreover, there are two types of branches in protection systems. One is physical, whereas the other is logical.
1) PHYSICAL BRANCH
The physical branch description set P-Branch ij , as presented in (5), is defined to indicate the physical components of Branch ij ,
2) LOGICAL BRANCH
The logical branch description set L-Branch ij is defined to indicate the logical components of Branch ij , where '' VLAN i−j '' is the standard naming of the logical branch pointing from port i to port j, and '' network '' denotes the certain network to which Branch ij belongs, that is
In summary, the connection scheme of a protection system can be shown as (7) below.
The 1×4 vector matrix F is defined to describe to the function characteristics of a protective relaying device in terms of the selectivity, speed, sensibility and reliability. Here, we have
E. RALATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PSOCM AND THE PSOC
According to the PSOCM, the target statuses to be assessed, i.e., the PSOC, can be determined. Define S Di , S Ci , S I , S net , S cable , S fiber , S port and S VLAN to indicate the status of the device health, device configuration, information, networks, cables, fibers, ports and VLANs, respectively. S equals 1 when the status is an abnormal and equals zero otherwise. The corresponding relationships between the PSOCM and the PSOC are listed in Table 1 . 
IV. OPERATION CONDITION ASSESSMENT METHOD FOR PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Based on the proposed PSOCM and collected monitoring information, an OCA method to assess the PSOC is proposed in this section.
A. DEVICE STATUS ASSESSMENT METHOD
When assessing the status of a device, it is necessary to evaluate the condition of its hardware and software, the two components of a device. In this paper, we utilize the health status to denote the device hardware condition, and the consistency of device configuration parameters to represent the software status.
1) DEVICE HEALTH ASSESSMENT METHOD
The health status of a device is always considered an important object to be evaluated in the OCA. With the help of condition monitoring infrastructure deployment, the volume of monitoring information that can be applied in OCA is becoming larger. Suppose that there is a total of n monitoring items that are relevant in the device health status. The outcomes of different monitoring items might be in different ranges and can only reflect separated conditions. Thus, a normalized process to obtain an overall result is necessary.
• A measurement z, whose normal interval is [Z min , H ], indicates an optimal condition when it reaches its minimum Z min and an abnormal condition when it is greater than H . In this case, z can be normalized as z *
• A measurement z, whose normal interval is [L, Z max ], indicates an optimal condition when it reaches its maximum Z max and an abnormal condition when it is smaller than L. In this case, z can be normalized as z *
In China, all these measurement items and their rated ranges are listed in the standard [20] , where the value of Z min , Z max , H and L can be determined. To obtain an overall result, equation (11) is proposed to calculate the health index of device i, which is noted as HI i . Note that the weightings represent the relative importance among various types of monitoring items. The greater the weight is, the more important the monitoring item is. Eventually, a larger HI i means more attention should be paid to the device.
Generally, a threshold σ i is set to activate an abnormal alarm when the HI i is greater than its associated threshold. To summarize, the OCA method for device health status is shown in Fig. 3 . Note that T is the time interval between two inspections that can be configured. 
2) DEVICE CONFIGURATION ASSESSMENT METHOD
Despite device health status assessment, the assessment of device configuration parameters is equally important in the OCA, although it has not yet been paid sufficient attention.
A consistency detector in Fig. 4 can be used to examine the inconsistencies between the configured setting values and start-up values of a protective relaying device. In Fig. 4 , the parameters C Oi · · · C Mi have been discussed in Section III-A. When time reaches its preset threshold, the proposed consistency detector compares the parameters collected in realtime with the parameters stored beforehand. An abnormal alarm is alerted when differences are detected. The prestored parameters can be configured during the planning stage or previous faultless detection. The validity analysis of setting values and start-up values is not discussed in this paper, these values are considered rational and can be regarded as the correct answer during consistency detection. Regarding the strap status, the assessment method can also be implemented by the consistency detector in Fig. 4 with several rules. Similarly, abnormal alarms are alerted when rules are dissatisfied, i.e., S Ci equals 1. The following are two basic rules to evaluate the strap status.
• Protective relaying devices should be in the operation mode when their associated primary devices are in operation or hot-stand-by modes. In this case, the publishing straps, receiving straps and function straps should remain connected, whereas maintenance straps should be switched off.
• During the maintenance mode, the publishing straps, receiving straps and function straps of a protective relaying device which should be cut while its maintenance strap should be put on.
B. INFORMATION STATUS ASSESSMENT METHOD
The implementation of a protection system depends highly on devices and information transmission, especially a networked system. Specifically, incorrect information transmission may influence the effectiveness and reliability of protection systems, even causing cascading failures for the power system; hence, information status assessment is essential for a networked protection system. In protection systems, the properties of information include the data category (DC) and the data value (DV). During the transmission process, the publishing time interval (T ) and frequency (V ) of a data package, the carrier of a piece of information, should also be considered. In terms of the communication network, information load (L), throughput capacity (TC) and probability of information loss (P L ) are VOLUME 7, 2019 some basic characteristics [14] . In normal cases, these properties should be in their correct ranges; otherwise, incorrect information cases occur. Therefore, in Fig. 5 , an information detector and a network detector are proposed to assess the information status. 
C. BRANCH STATUS ASSESSMENT METHOD
According to the IEC 61850-based substation technical specifications, all three branch faults (time delay, error code and interruption) would cause loss of data packages, and eventually resulting in data loss alerts [16] . Mostly, however, a data package should be transported through several branches before successfully reaching its destination. Therefore, a mere data loss alert of one data package is not sufficient to deduce the exact faulted branch among others.
Based on the common fact that each information branch in a protection system may carry more than one piece of data package, several data loss alerts may occur at the same time when an interruption of a branch occurs [22] . Considering the low probability of multifaults, the location of a disconnected branch can be deduced based on all simultaneous data loss alerts.
In this subsection, a simple and practical fault location method for information branches is proposed. Here, a networked protection system instead of a peer-to-peer counterpart is illustrated since the latter can be regarded as a simplified version of the former. Assume that b data packages among a total of a are lost because of a branch interruption. A fault location analysis matrix G can be calculated by
where J denotes the alarm information branch matrix, whose element j ij indicates the number of alerts in I-Branch ij . K is the normal information branch matrix, where the element k ij indicates the number of normal information flows in I-Branch ij , which equals the difference value between the sum and the number of abnormal information flows in I-Branch ij . The largest element g ij of matrix G represents the most likely faulted branch. If there is more than one maximum element in G, then the possible fault location would be the initial branch of the same alert data package carried by each branch that corresponds to each maximum element. In addition, the status of the CY i in the PSOCM can be used to further judge the failure reason: 1) if it remains unchanged, then the precise fault location can be shrunk to the cable/fiber and its two-end ports of the faulted physical branch or the VLAN and its two-end switch ports of the fault logical branch; 2) otherwise, the switch of straps may result in this information disconnection.
In conclusion, the BS of protection systems can be assessed by deducing whether a branch is normal with 0 representing faultless and 1 indicating a branch fault.
D. FUNCTION STATUS ASSESSMENT METHOD
To evaluate the FS of a protective relaying device in terms of selectivity, speed, sensibility and reliability, four assessment indexes and several rules are proposed in this subsection.
1) ASSESSMENT INDEX
Many current assessment methods for the relay function are based on the relay tripping results. However, notably, there are some cases in which the relay remains in a steady state, whereas the measurement value is beyond its setting value due to the time-dial setting; therefore, the relay function cannot be accurately assessed by only considering its start-up and tripping results. In this subsection, four assessment indexes, presented in (13)-(16), which are based on valuable raw data, are proposed to evaluate the function of a protective relaying device.
a: STARTING DISTANCE d S
The starting distance denotes the relative difference between the relay start-up value and measurement value, which can be calculated as follows:
The operating distance denotes the relative difference between the relay setting values and measurement value, which can be calculated as follows:
The operating frequency indicates the number of times when the measurement value passes across the setting boundary after the relay's set up and before the fault is cleared. A count function Count () is defined; it is incremented each time the number inside the bracket crosses zero. f O can be computed as follows:
d: START-OPERATE INTERVAL t OS
The start-operate interval refers to the time between a relay start up and operation. Suppose that the start-up time of a relay is t S , and the time when it sends control command is t O . Therefore denote the main protection and the backup protection for the adjacent nonfault component, respectively. It is worth noting that duplicated protection scheme is generally utilized in the protection system. Since duplicated protective relaying devices should operate the same under normal conditions, the assessment method for the duplicated arrangement is identical to the single one. To simplify, we illustrate the assessment method by exemplifying the single set protection.
a: SELECTIVITY
Rule: The starting distance of P M f −1 should be less than zero, whereas that of P B f −1 should be greater than zero. The startoperate interval of P B f −1 is greater than that of P B f , which is also greater than that of P M f . Therefore, we have
b: SPEED Rule: The start-operate of P M f should be less than its rated
c: SENSIBILITY Rule: The operating frequency of P M f , P B f and P B f −1 should be at least one.
Rules for the faulted component: The starting distance and the operating distance of P M f should both be greater than zero, and so are those of P B i .
Rules for the adjacent unfaulted component: The operating distance of the main protection should be negative, whereas that of backup protection should be positive (See (17)).
Rules for distant components: The operating distance of their main protection should all be less than zero.
3) ASSESSMENT METHOD
Define the relay function assessment vector
, in which the element a f 1 to a f 6 corresponds to the result of (17)- (22) separately. The element equals zero when the situation agrees with the relevant equation and equals one otherwise. The assessment method for the relay protection function is shown in Fig. 6 , where RO indicates refusal operation, MO indicates mal-operation and HF means hidden failure. In summary, the overall assessment method for PSOC is depicted in Fig. 7 . The assessment of the DS is time-driven based on its preset time threshold, while that of the IS operates in real-time. As soon as an abnormal IS alert occurs, the BS assessment is activated to deduce the faulted branch. The FS is analyzed when a line fault event occurs. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we illustrate an implementation scheme for the proposed OCA method based on an IEC 61850-based protection system. To reduce the information transmission and analysis workloads between the maintenance station and the master station, an MS-OCAS is proposed in this paper, which can realize distributed analysis in substations and centralized analysis in the master station.
A. ARCHITECTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE MS-OCAS
The architecture of the MS-OCAS is shown in Fig. 8 . This system consists of an OCAS and an OCAM. Each OCAS is installed between the process bay and the station bay in the IEC 61850-based substation to monitor and detect operation condition failures. To reduce wirings, the OCAS is designed in an embedded scheme that consists of an information monitoring unit (IMU) and an information analysis unit (IAU) in an integrated device. The IMU collects monitoring information in the substation, while the IAU is considered the local monitoring and analysis center. The OCAM, which collects OCA results and relay action results from each OCAS, is aimed at assessing the FS of each protection system and returns the assessment results to the corresponding substations.
As shown in Fig. 9 , there are five modules in an OCAS: 
1) CONFIGURATION INFORMATION COLLECTION MODULE
In this module, the PSOCM is generated based on the configuration information from the substation configuration description (SCD) file using the SCD parser.
2) REAL-TIME INFORMATION COLLECTION MODULE
In this module, GOOSE/SV information flows from the process bus, MMS information flows from the station bus, and the monitoring data from device indicators and sensors are captured and parsed timely through the information exchange interface.
3) OPERATION CONDITION ASSESSMENT METHOD MODULE
In the IAU of the OCAS, the OCA method to assess the DS, IS and BS discussed in Section III is programmed in this critical module. Meanwhile, that of OCAM contains the OCA method for the FS.
4) OPERATION CONDITION ASSESSMENT RULE MODULE
In this module, professional knowledge and configurationspecific data during the assessment processes are preconfigured and stored. For example, the normal publishing interval of GOOSE messages is 5 seconds, the thresholds of the consistency detector are set to 5%, and the time interval of status monitoring is configured as 4 hours.
5) OPERATION CONDITION ASSESSMENT RESULT MODULE
The assessment results along with the alerts are displayed on the screen of the monitoring server in the substation and recorded in log files.
B. INFORMATION EXCHANGE
The dispatch communication network built by a high-speed and reliable fiber network is deployed between substations, which can be used as the information exchange tool for the MS-OCES. The publish/subscribe mechanism, including request, inform and confirm, can be utilized within this system. The information exchange scheme of the MS-OCES is demonstrated as the green arrows in Fig. 8 . The corresponding information or datasets based on IEC 61850 protocols of each number in Fig. 8 are listed in Table 2 . 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. DESCRIPTION
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed method and system, the authors cooperated with the Dispatching and Control Center of Guangdong Power Grid Co. Ltd. and NARI-Relays Electric Co. Ltd. and has developed an MS-OCAS prototype and affiliated software. This prototype was installed in the Xiyue substation, a 110 kV IEC 61850-based substation in Foshan city in China, and has operated for 12 months. During the experiment, the assessment object was the corresponding protection system of the primary devices in the dashed box in the left corner of Fig. 10 . The protective relaying device, which is implemented as a single set, uses the ''networked sampling and networked tripping'' principle. The communication networks are configured as a single star scheme both in the process bay and station bay. All OCA results were depicted as colored cylinders in the software (See the screenshots in Fig. 10 ).
Before the installment of the MS-OCAS, the device status monitoring information and strap switching were unobservable. The PSOC was assessed via a traditional time-hierarchical OCA method, including daily routine inspection (RI), quarterly inspection (QI), and periodical inspection (PI) implemented every three years, i.e., 1095 days [20] . Notably, during the PI, considerable outage time is inevitable since each inspection item costs hours of offline testing.
After the installment, the unobservable information was collected and sent with a constant frequency. Temperature sensors, moisture sensors and online insulation inspectors were deployed for the purpose of collecting sufficient monitoring information of the protection system. Furthermore, the average and maximum data packets sent for the OCAS prototype were only 11 Kbit/s and 12 Mbit/s, respectively. Because of its 100 Mbps bandwidth, the data acquisition time was relatively small. Moreover, the assessment time was a few seconds.
B. RESULTS
During the trial run, 1 device fault and 3 branch interruptions were discovered by the OCAS. Moreover, after a single-phase ground fault occurred in L1, this system discovered a hidden failure of the backup protection of L1 (See Fig. 11 ). The experiment results with and without the prototype are compared in Table 3 , where T I denotes inspection interval (days) and N I denotes the number of inspection items. As shown by the experimental results, the T I of the DS increased impressively (6 times in the RI, 540 times in the QI and 6570 times in the PI) since the inspection time threshold VOLUME 7, 2019 was set as 4 hours. The assessment of the IS, BS and FS changed from offline to online. According to the technical specifications in [20] , there are a total of 14, 10 and 11 inspection items required in RI, QI and PI, separately. With the prototype, only 4 RI and 1 PI inspection items (RI: abnormal noise / smoke or burn / blocking / outdoor wiring inspections, PI: equipment exterior inspection) require additional help from the O&M staffs. As a result, most inspection items (71.4% of RI, 100% of QI and 90.9% of PI) could be assessed automatically and frequently.
C. EXPERIMENTAL CONCLUSIONS
The experimental results show that the proposed method can offer considerable guidance benefits to the OCA of protection systems. Specifically, in the substation, the DS, BS and IS can be assessed locally based on the regularly collected monitoring information. Driven by the primary faults, the FS can be assessed based on tripping information and other raw data from relevant substations, and hidden failures can be detected according to external faults.
Furthermore, the developed MS-OCAS can detect anomalies in a short time, realizing an efficient OCA for protection systems. Compared with traditional OCA methods, the inspection frequency has sharply increased, thereby guaranteeing the reliability of protection systems in a shorter time period. With the deployment of condition monitoring sensors, large proportion of basic information that can be utilized to assess the PSOC could be collected timely. Therefore the outage time due to the offline OCA method decreased dramatically and hidden troubles because of human intervention can be avoided at the same time.
VII. CONCLUSION
To efficiently address the OCA issue, this paper has proposed an OCA model and method based on collected monitoring information. Afterwards, the MS-OCAS, which can assess the PSOC in both distributed and centralized manners, in addition to its architecture, critical modules and information exchange scheme, is illustrated.
The proposed OCA method can not only analyze the device status and relay functions, but also considers the impacts of information flows and communication networks on protection systems, thereby realizing a whole-view assessment of the PSOC. Moreover, the previous offline assessment method is transformed into an online and real-time method by deeply mining the value of the collected monitoring information. According to the experimental results, the MS-OCAS inspected and analyzed the PSOC in a shorter time period, indicating that it outperforms the previous OCA method. In addition, since fewer inspection items were needed, the electricity outage time spent on scheduled periodical inspections and maintenance workloads decreased sharply. Meanwhile, hidden troubles caused by human intervention could be efficiently avoided.
Future work will focus on discussing the validity of the collected monitoring information to mitigate the risks caused by mistake monitoring information and malicious information attacks.
